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How to Write Priority Intelligence Requirements for a Bank SOC

Tie threat intelligence to payment, fraud and resilience risk with clear PIRs, tag indicators by PIR in Sentinel and prove which feeds actually earn their keep.

Most bank SOCs receive far more threat intelligence than anyone can read. Without priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), feeds pile up indicators, nobody can say which ones matter, and the board question "which threats should we worry about?" gets a generic answer. This guide shows threat intelligence and SOC analysts in banks, payment firms and trading businesses how to write PIRs tied to business risk, wire them into Microsoft Sentinel and measure whether the intelligence is changing anything.

What a PIR isA question a named decision maker needs answered
How manyA handful, reviewed every quarter
Proof it worksHunts, detections and decisions it changed
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Scenario: The CISO of a mid sized UK bank asks the threat intelligence team to justify renewing three commercial feeds before the next budget meeting. In the same week, the payments fraud team complains that it hears about new invoice fraud lures from customers before the SOC does, and the operational resilience team wants threat input for its important business services self assessment. You have four weeks, two analysts and a Sentinel workspace full of indicators that nobody has reviewed in months.

Start from business risk, not from feeds

The intelligence cycle starts with direction: someone has to say what they need to know. If you start from the feeds you already buy, you end up describing the threat landscape in general rather than the threats to your bank. Start instead with what the business cannot afford to lose.

In UK financial services, a ready made list often exists already. Under the FCA and PRA operational resilience rules, firms identify their important business services, such as making payments, giving customers access to accounts or executing trades, and set impact tolerances for them. Each of those services has an owner, and each owner is a potential consumer of intelligence.

Important servicesPayments, online banking, card processing, trading and settlement, each with a named owner.
Threats that move moneyFraud and extortion are the outcomes your board cares about, not malware families.
Regulatory dutiesDORA for EU entities, FCA and PRA expectations, and incident reporting deadlines.

Then list the threat areas that could hurt those services. Most banks end up with a similar set, weighted differently by business model.

Payment fraud and BECBusiness email compromise, invoice redirection and authorised push payment scams.
Ransomware and extortionEncryption and data theft against core banking, payments and back office systems.
Third party compromiseAttacks through software suppliers, managed service providers and payment processors.
Customer channel disruptionDDoS against online banking and APIs, especially around pay days and market events.
Insiders and mulesStaff recruited or coerced, and money mule networks moving stolen funds.
Customer credential theftPhishing kits and infostealers that harvest online banking logins at scale.

Write PIRs someone can actually answer

A PIR is a question, not a topic. "Ransomware" is a topic. "Which ransomware groups are currently targeting UK banks or their critical suppliers, and how do they get initial access?" is a question you can answer, update and close. A useful PIR has five parts:

  • The question, specific enough that you would know when it has been answered.
  • The decision it supports, such as which controls to fund or which detections to build first.
  • The consumer, a named role who will act on the answer.
  • The time horizon, for example the next 12 months for strategic questions or the next week for tactical ones.
  • A review date, so stale PIRs are retired rather than left to drift.
IDQuestionConsumerDecision it supports
PIR-01Which BEC and invoice fraud techniques are being used against UK corporate banking customers and our own finance team?Head of Fraud, SOC leadPayment verification controls, detection priorities
PIR-02Which ransomware or extortion groups are targeting UK financial services or our critical suppliers, and how do they get in?CISO, operational resilience leadControl investment, tabletop scenarios
PIR-03Are any of our critical third parties suffering a compromise or active exploitation of a product we use?Third party risk, SOC leadSupplier contact, temporary access restrictions
PIR-04Is anyone preparing phishing infrastructure or fake apps that impersonate our brand?Digital channels owner, fraudTakedown requests, customer warnings
PIR-05Are threat actors discussing our bank, staff or systems in criminal or extortion channels?CISO, legalIncident readiness, insider investigations
+

Tip: Agree each PIR with its consumer face to face, then send them the wording to confirm. A PIR the Head of Fraud helped write is one they will read the answers to. A PIR the SOC wrote alone tends to produce reports nobody opens.

PIRs also sit at different levels, and each level has a different audience and rhythm. Make sure your set covers all three, or you will serve the SOC well and the board badly, or the other way round.

Tactical

Indicators and alerts

Domains, IP addresses, hashes and lures to block or hunt this week. Consumed by analysts and detection engineers.

New phishing domain imitating your login page
Operational

Campaigns and techniques

How a specific group operates, mapped to ATT&CK, so you can build durable detections and hunts.

Extortion group abusing remote support tools
Strategic

Trends and risk

Which threats are growing, who they target and what that means for investment. Consumed by the CISO and board.

Rise in supplier compromise across the sector

Break each PIR into collection questions

A PIR is usually too broad to collect against directly. Split each one into a few specific questions, then decide where the answers will come from. For PIR-01, that might be: which lure themes are customers reporting, which sender domains appear in reported phishing, and which mailbox rule patterns appear in confirmed compromises.

  • Internal telemetry first: fraud case notes, user phishing reports, SOC incidents and customer complaints are often the best source for fraud PIRs.
  • Sector sharing: communities such as FS-ISAC share campaign details and indicators between financial institutions.
  • Government: NCSC advisories and alerts, and joint advisories from international partners.
  • Commercial feeds: judge each one by which PIRs it answers, not by the number of indicators it supplies.
  • Open source: vendor research blogs, certificate transparency logs and public reporting on supplier incidents.
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Note: DORA Article 45 allows financial entities to exchange cyber threat information and intelligence within trusted communities, and requires them to notify their competent authority when they join such an arrangement. If your bank has EU entities, check with compliance that your sharing memberships have been notified, and handle shared material according to its Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking.

Tag intelligence by PIR in Sentinel

Once PIRs exist, make them visible in your tooling. Ask whoever manages your threat intelligence platform to add a tag such as PIR-01 to indicators that relate to each requirement. Those tags travel with the indicator into Sentinel.

Use the current tables. Sentinel stopped ingesting into the legacy ThreatIntelligenceIndicator table in 2025 and support for it ended on 31 May 2026. Indicators now land in ThreatIntelIndicators, with STIX objects such as threat actors and attack patterns in ThreatIntelObjects. Indicators are republished every 7 to 10 days, so take the latest row per indicator before counting.

Microsoft Sentinel, active indicators by feed and PIRKQL
ThreatIntelIndicators
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by Id
| where IsDeleted == false
| where isnull(ValidUntil) or ValidUntil > now()
| extend FeedSource = base64_decode_tostring(tostring(split(Id, "---")[0]))
| extend PIR = extract(@"(PIR-\d+)", 1, tostring(Tags))
| extend PIR = iff(isempty(PIR), "Untagged", PIR)
| summarize Indicators = dcount(Id) by FeedSource, PIR, ObservableKey
| order by FeedSource asc, Indicators desc

The FeedSource line decodes the source name from the first part of the indicator ID, which is the method Microsoft uses in its own example queries. A feed whose indicators are almost all "Untagged" is supplying data that nobody has linked to a requirement.

Counting indicators only tells you what you hold. The more useful question is which feeds produced matches in your own telemetry. This query joins active IP indicators to Entra ID sign in logs, which suits PIR-01 because BEC usually starts with a stolen login.

Microsoft Sentinel, indicator matches by feedKQL
let ActiveIPs = ThreatIntelIndicators
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by Id
    | where IsDeleted == false
    | where isnull(ValidUntil) or ValidUntil > now()
    | where ObservableKey == "ipv4-addr:value"
    | extend FeedSource = base64_decode_tostring(tostring(split(Id, "---")[0]))
    | project IndicatorIP = ObservableValue, FeedSource, Confidence, Tags;
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| join kind=inner ActiveIPs on $left.IPAddress == $right.IndicatorIP
| summarize SignIns = count(),
    Successful = countif(ResultType == "0"),
    Users = dcount(UserPrincipalName),
    SampleUsers = make_set(UserPrincipalName, 10)
    by FeedSource, IndicatorIP
| order by Successful desc, SignIns desc
!

Watch out: A feed with few matches is not automatically worthless. A good feed for PIR-03 may rarely match because supplier compromises are rare. Judge each feed against the PIRs it is meant to serve, and record the outcome, such as "warned us about a supplier breach two days before the supplier did".

Turn PIRs into hunts and detections

Indicators expire. Techniques last much longer. For each operational PIR, map the behaviours you learn about to MITRE ATT&CK techniques, then check whether you have a detection or a scheduled hunt for each one. The gaps become your detection engineering backlog, already ranked by business risk.

PIRBehaviour reportedATT&CKSOC action
PIR-01Phishing links to fake Microsoft 365 login pagesT1566.002 Spearphishing LinkDetection on known kit patterns, user reporting button
PIR-01Mailbox rules that hide replies from a supplierT1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleAlert on new inbox rules in finance mailboxes
PIR-01Changed bank details on a supplier invoiceT1657 Financial TheftShared playbook with the payments team
PIR-02Shadow copy deletion before encryptionT1490 Inhibit System RecoveryHigh severity detection with automated isolation
PIR-02Unapproved remote support softwareT1219.002 Remote Desktop SoftwareWeekly hunt against the approved tool list

Then report on the PIRs the way the business reads risk. A quarterly summary like the one below gives the CISO something concrete for the budget conversation in the scenario.

Quarterly PIR report example bank, Q3
5/5PIRs with a named consumer
9Detections built from PIR findings
14Hunts run against PIR techniques
1PIR with no useful source
3Fraud lures shared with payments team
71%Indicators with no PIR tag
2Supplier warnings before vendor notice
1Feed with no PIR value
Decision: Renew two feeds that answered PIR-01 and PIR-03, drop the third, and fund brand monitoring to cover PIR-04.

Review, report and retire PIRs

PIRs are not permanent. Review them every quarter with their consumers, and immediately after a major incident, a new regulatory requirement or a change in the business, such as launching a new payment product. Ask three questions each time: was the PIR answered, did the answer change a decision, and is the question still the right one?

  1. L0
    Feed drivenIntelligence is whatever arrives. Reports describe the landscape in general.
    Common start
  2. L1
    PIRs writtenA small set of agreed questions with named consumers and review dates.
    CTI team
  3. L2
    PIRs in toolingIndicators tagged by PIR, techniques mapped to ATT&CK and to detections.
    CTI and SOC
  4. L3
    PIRs drive spendFeed renewals, detection backlog and testing scenarios all justified against PIRs.
    CISO

Well maintained PIRs also feed regulatory work. Threat led penetration testing under CBEST in the UK, or TLPT under DORA for EU entities, begins with a targeted threat intelligence phase, and your PIR answers give that phase a strong starting point. Your important business services self assessment benefits in the same way, because severe but plausible scenarios are easier to defend when they rest on documented intelligence.

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Watch out: The most common failure is PIR creep, where every stakeholder adds a question until the list covers everything and prioritises nothing. If a new PIR is added, ask which existing one it replaces. Two analysts cannot answer twenty priority questions well.

Key takeaways

  1. Start PIRs from important business services and the threats that move money, not from the feeds you already buy.
  2. Write each PIR as a question with a decision, a named consumer, a time horizon and a review date.
  3. Break PIRs into collection questions, and treat internal fraud and incident data as a primary source.
  4. Tag indicators by PIR and query ThreatIntelIndicators, since the legacy table is retired.
  5. Map PIR findings to ATT&CK techniques and use the gaps as a risk ranked detection backlog.
  6. Review PIRs quarterly and use them to justify feed renewals, testing scenarios and resilience work.

Book thirty minutes with your Head of Fraud and your operational resilience lead this month and draft three PIRs together. Then run the first query above to see how much of your current intelligence already relates to them. The gap between the two is usually the clearest argument you will have for where the intelligence budget should go next.

Written by Riz, Senior Cybersecurity Consultant, Finance

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